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INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION OF PREPRODUCTION
DISCLOSURES
Company X manufactures products and has design and re-
search groups engaged in the development of new products. The
company, being alert to customer needs, may submit proposals for
new products to present or prospective customers, or the customers
may request proposals from the company. These proposals may
be in the form of blueprints, drawings, or samples.
To derive any advantage from its effort, company X must
disclose these proposals to the customer for evaluation or testing
purposes. At the same time, the company wants to protect what
it considers to be a proprietary interest in the proposals. Company
X may also seek some monetary return by charging the customer
for the cost of producing the samples or the engineering time-
while still protecting its proprietary interest in the disclosures.
The optimum solution would be an express written agreement
providing that the samples, blueprints and the like are trade secrets
of company X and are confidential; that the customer is consid-
ered to be in a position of trust with company X; and that any
disclosure, sale, or use of the samples or blueprints, or three di-
mensional models of the information contained in blueprints or
drawings without authorization of company X is a breach of that
confidence and trust. This agreement would be in conjunction
with a sale for experimental purposes only, which would include
both the cost of producing the samples and the engineering costs.
In this way company X would have complete protection before
releasing the proposal to the customer.
The difficulty, however, is that often the customer will not
accept such an express agreement. The question, then, is how
company X can protect its interest from a commercially practical
standpoint.
This Comment will analyze the various means a company may
employ to protect preproduction disclosures which have been de-
signed for a customer. More particularly, methods will be sug-
gested to prevent the customer from reverse engineering the dis-
closures and producing the disclosed product, and to prevent the
customer from distributing the disclosures to competitors of the
disclosing company for competitive bids. Particular attention will
be directed to patent, copyright, trade secret and contract protec-
tion.
PATENT PROTECTION
Patent protection is of limited value. Blueprints may not be
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patented.1 Samples and the products or articles embodied in the
blueprints may or may not be patentable.- To file an application
for each proposal, some of which may never reach fruition, would
be costly and time consuming.3 Furthermore, company X could
not sue for infringement until the patent issued, and could recover
only for infringement occurring after issuance.4 By the time of
issuance infringement proceedings may not be available or advis-
able.5
If no patent is applied for prior to disclosure and the disclosure
is without restriction, it will amount to a public disclosure.6 This
will invoke the statutory bar of 35 U.S.C. section 102, 7 for even a
single unrestricted disclosure will start the one year grace period
after which the right to patent is lost.8 In order to avoid the oper-
ation of section 102 company X must establish that the disclosure
was made for experimental or testing purposes. To do so requires
an express or implied agreement between the customer and com-
pany X, which will go not only to show experimental use, but also
to demonstrate the existence of a confidential relationship, a sub-
1. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discloses any new and useful process,,
machine, manufacture, compositio of matter, .or any new and
useful improvement thereof may obtain a patent therefor.'.
(emphasis added).
2. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). Design protection is'also a
possibility. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1952). For purposes of this
Comment, mechanical and design protection is not always distinguished,
since the relevant sections of Title 35 are applicable to both.. .
3. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1952). The basic fee for filing and
issuing a single patent is $165.00. The usual length of time from filing to
allowance is three (3) years. The fees are lower and the time from filing
to allowance is somewhat less for design patents.
4. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §. 271 (1952).
Infringement of patents
(a) [W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any
patented invention, within the United States during the term
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent (emphasis added).
5. By the time of issuance the alleged infringer may have stopped
making, using or selling the item. Thus, there would be no infringement.
Alternatively, his production may have dropped off to the point -that the
damages would be negligible by the time of issuance, .
6. Patent. Act, 35 U.S.C..§ 102 (1952). .
7. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952)..
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent:unless-
(b) The invention was patented or described in a printed
publication. in this or a foreign country or in public use or on
-sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States.... ! .
8. McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir.
1965); National Cash Register Co. V. American Cash Register Co., 178 F. :79
(2d Cir. 1910). For discussion of what constitutes public -sale and use. see




ject treated under trade secrets. The company may give, lend,
or sell the proposal for experimental use. A sale does not ipso
facto mean a public disclosure:
(a) use by the inventor, for the purpose of testing the ma-
chine, in order by experiment to devise additional means
for perfecting the success of its operation is admissible,
and where, as incident to such use, the product of its opera-
tion is disposed of by sale, such profit from its use does not
change its character; but where the use is mainly for the
purpose of trade and profit, and the experiment is merely
incidental to that, the principal and not the incident must
give character to the use. The thing implied as excepted
out of the prohibition of the statute is a use which may be
properly characterized as substantially for purpose of ex-
periment.0
If the proposal could have been tested at company X's facili-
ties, however, the burden of showing that the sale was for experi-
mental purposes is heightened. 10 Thus, where environmental
testing is possible at the place of the vendor, the proposal should
be given or loaned, but not sold. Company X should also decide
the items for which it is charging the customer when it sells
the proposal. Charging for engineering time plus manufacture
of the samples may leave room for the argument that the customer
bought the proposal outright, creating a public disclosure. Merely
charging for the samples, however, indicates that the cost of mate-
rials and tooling are being recouped, thereby retaining the experi-
mental use status of the sale.
Establishing an experimental use is also important in light of
proposed patent legislation and the Sears-Compco" doctrine. Un-
der the proposed act, any public disclosure will result in a statutory
bar.12 The one year grace period for public use of an invention
prior to application for a patent has been eliminated. Experimental
use, however, is still protected and does not constitute a public dis-
closure. Under the Sears-Cornpco doctrine, the Supreme Court has
said that anything in the public domain which is not patented
may be freely copied.18 Thus, anything publicly disclosed may be
copied until a patent issues. A patent pending notice on the pro-
posal merely warns of possible future infringement and may be dis-
regarded by the customer. The notice may, however, be of some aid
in establishing a confidential relationship, a point which will be
discussed under trade secrets. If the proposal is never patented,
it may be freely copied indefinitely. Patent protection by itself
9. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256 (1887).
10. See Delamater v. Deely, 53 F. 380 (2d Cir. 1892).
11. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
12. S.1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1967).
13. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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is therefore inadequate to cope with the problem in the absence
of a confidential relationship. Even when the relationship of com-
pany X to the customer is confidential the patent statutes only
give protection after the patent has issued. Recovery before that
date must be based upon some other theory.
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
There are two types of copyright-common law copyright and
statutory copyright. The common law copyright gives the holder
the right to first publish or publicly disclose the work and to pre-
vent others from first publicly disclosing the holder's work. 14 The
statutory copyright prevents persons other than the holder from
copying or reproducing the work.15 The two cannot coexist, be-
cause to obtain the statutory copyright protection, the holder (com-
pany X) is required to publicly disclose the work.'8 Publication
destroys the common law copyright, and if there is a publication
without the proper statutory copyright notice, the statutory copy-
right is also lost.'
7
Only certain items may receive statutory copyright protection.
Generally, three dimensional utilitarian devices cannot be copy-
righted."8 The doctrine of Mazer v. Stein,19 which held that an
artistic statuette was copyrightable even though mass produced, is
not contrary to this position. The Mazer court did not say that
mechanical devices were statutorily copyrightable per se; the work
14. DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrold, 213 F. Supp. 184 (D.C. Fla. 1963);
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
15. DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrold, 213 F. Supp. 184 (D.C. Fla. 1963);
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
16. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1947).
Publication of work with notice
A person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright
for his work by publication thereof with a notice of copyright
required by this title....
17. Publication destroys the common law copyright. See Burnett v.
Lambeno, 204 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); A. J. Sandy, Inc. v. Junior
City, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 407, 234 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See
generally H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 57 (1944).
Publication without the statutory notice results in permanent loss of
statutory protection. See Metro Assoc. Services, Inc. v. Webster City
Graphic, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Wrench v. Universal Fix-
tures Co., 104 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See generally L. AMDUR,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 366-90 (1936); H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
AND LITERARY PPOPERTY 155-74 (1944).
18. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a), (c) (1967). The copyright office defines
what is copyrightable:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that
the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a
work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incor-
porates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving or pictorial
representation, which can be identified separately and are capable
of existing independently as a work of art, such features will be
eligible for registration.
19. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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still had to be "artistic" within the meaning of the statute. Me-
chanical or chemical samples sent by company X for proposal pur-
poses are not normally artistic, therefore not copyrightable under
17 U.S.C. section 5.2o Two dimensional blueprints of the three di-
mensional device are apparently copyrightable under 17 U.S.C.
section 5(i),21 which pertains to drawings of a scientific or techni-
cal nature.
This two dimensional-three dimensional statutory protection
is important because it is not statutory copyright infringement to
make a three dimensional embodiment of a two dimensional blue-
print.22 Thus, so long as the customer does not copy or reproduce
20. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1947).
21. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 5(i) (1947).
Classification of works for registration
The application for registration shall specify to which of the
following classes the work in which copyright claim belongs;
... (i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical
character.
See also B. RINGER & P. GITLIN, COPYRIGHTS 12-13 (rev. ed. 1965), where
the authors say in regard to § 5(i) :
This widely misunderstood category does not include slide rules,
wheel dials and similar computing or measuring devices. It is
limited to 2- and 3- dimensional works which are "designed for
scientific and technical use and which contain copyrightable graph-
ic, pictorial or sculptural material." Examples are mechanical
drawings, architect's blueprints, anatomical models and engineer-
ing diagrams. The term "plastic" in this context merely refers to
3-dimensional sculptured or molded works. It has nothing to do
with the material from which the work is manufactured (em-
phasis added).
22. Seip v. Commonwealth Plastics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass.
1949); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Opinion of
the Comptroller General of the United States, 90 U.S.P.Q. 150 (1951). But
see King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924), where
the court found that a doll infringed a copyrighted cartoon; Jones Bros.
Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936), where a copyrighted
design for a cemetary monument was held to be infringed by the monu-
ment. For a discussion of this point see Nimmer, The Nature of the
Rights Protected by Copyright, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 60, 78 (1963). Professor
Nimmer indicates that a three dimensional copy of a two dimensional
copyrighted design, under the doctrine of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879), will not be copyright infringement "if the copy is made for pur-
poses of use rather than explanation." Id. at 78. He cites the Muller
case, supra, where an architectural plan of a bridge was not infringed by
the bridge itself. Professor Nimmer concludes that obtaining a copyright
under section 5(i) (relating to scientific drawings) eliminates liability for
those who make three dimensional copies, because the copy will by defini-
tion be made for use. However, if the two dimensional design can be
registered as a work of art, a three dimensional copy will most probably
be for purposes of explanation. 'This will invoke the protection of section
l(b), which allows the holder of the copyright to complete, execute and
finish the three dimensional work. As noted, however, preproduction
blueprints are not works of art. This explains the King and Jones cases,
supra.
One explanation for this situation may be that if the use is of primary
importance, the patent statutes should be invoked to protect the manu-
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the blueprint itself,23 there is no liability if the customer shows
the original copyrighted blueprint to competitors of company X.
Both the competitors and the customer may construct the three
dimensional embodiment of the two dimensional design with
impunity.
The same distinction apparently does not lie for the common
law copyright. One may show a work which has not been given
statutory protection to third parties without losing the common
law copyright if the showing is restricted both as to parties and
purposes. This is termed a limited publication, which depends
largely upon the existence of a confidential relationship.24 There
is therefore an overlap of trade secret law and common law copy-
right protection. Lack of a confidential relationship destroys both.
A restriction on the blueprint such as "unpublished work" or
"subject to common law copyright" would indicate that a limited
publication was intended. Publication is a question of fact, how-
ever, and merely because company X says the publication is re-
stricted does not make it limited.
As noted in the trade secret section of this Comment, the law
prevents the customer from disclosing a trade secret, and a trade
secret does not turn on fine distinctions between two and three
dimensional embodiments. The common law copyright prevents the
customer from publishing the work. Company X, to state a.claim
for relief, must show that the publishing of a three dimensional
embodiment of a two dimensional blueprint by the customer is a
publication. This may not be difficult in light of the cases which
hold that an architect publishes his blueprint when he builds the
structure shown in the blueprint. 25 This raises an apparent con-
flict with federal statutory law, however. Since three dimensional
mechanical devices are not copyrightable under the copyright laws
factured article. However, this overlooks the problem of the need for
immediate protection. The patent statutes do not afford such protection,
but the copyright statutes do.
23. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
24. See H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 139-47
(1944).
A circulation is an act by which a literary proprietor parts with
possession of the original manuscript or a copy of it for any purpose
not exclusively confidential. Unless the circulation is restricted
both as to persons and purposes it is not deemed to be private.
Id.. at 141.. See also Allen v...Walt. Disney Productions, 41 F. Supp; 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1941), where it was held that an uncopyrighted manuscript of a
musical composition that was loaned to certain persons who. might have
been interested in publishing the work was not a sufficient publication to
constitute abandonment of the common law copyright.
25. Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 774, 345 P.2d 546 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959). The court said that any part of the building in public view was a
publication and could be copied. The interior, however, was, not published.
See Gendell v. Orr, 13 Phil. 191 (Pa. 1879); Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo.
App. 397,121 S.W.2d 282 (1938). See generally Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1391
(1960).; Note, 59 MICH. L. REV. 133.(1960). .
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and are not protected by the statutory copyright of the two dimen-
sional blueprint, should three dimensional embodiments be pro-
tected under the common law of copyright? If the Sears-Compco
doctrine is taken at face value, the answer should be no, because it
seems to say that common law protection will not be given in the
copyright area if the federal statutes do not grant protection..2 6
Assuming this interpretation is correct, company X should argue
the trade secret remedies by saying that the agreement between
company X and the customer, to consider the showing a limited
publication, was agreement to a confidential relationship for trade
secret purposes. Establishing a confidential relationship for trade
secret purposes, however, may require more than an "unpublished
work" stamp.
2 7
One real benefit of placing a common law copyright notice on
the blueprint relates to patent law. First, if the blueprint is un-
published, the bar of section 102 of the Patent Act does not begin
to run.2  Second, in those countries which do not allow a grace
period and which consider any publication a bar, the "unpub-
lished" notice permits the argument that there is no bar because
there has been no public disclosure.29
TRADE SECRETS
The topic of trade secrets can be subdivided by theory of re-
covery into the areas of unjust enrichment, breach of confidence or
trust, misappropriation and implied contract. No attempt will be
made to segregate these areas to a great extent, since the case
law interrelates these concepts to the point of inseparability. The
right to protect a trade secret and the concept of a trade secret as
a proprietary right were recognized in England as early as 1743 in
Giblett v. Read.30 A trade secret may be any "formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information which is used in one's busi-
ness and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it." 3' The subject of a
trade secret need not be patentable or copyrightable for it to be pro-
tected.3 2 That alone is an advantage. The disadvantage is that
26. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237
(1964).
27. See discussion p. 174 infra.
28. Section 102 creates a statutory bar if the invention is disclosed
publicly more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent applica-
tion. Therefore retention of a common law copyright indicates that no
public disclosure was intended.
29. For a discussion of the patent laws of foreign countries see H.
SCHEER, INTERNATIONAL PATENT DESIGN AND TRADEMARK LAW (1962); WHITE
& RAVENSCROFT, PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2d ed. 1967); LANGNER,
PARRY, CARD & LANCNER, FOREIGN PATENTS (4th ed. 1951).
30. 9 Mod. 459 (1743).
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 5 (1939).
32. Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716 (2d
[Vol. 72
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once publicly disclosed, it is lost.13  A further disadvantage is that
a trade secret does not give the holder the right to exclude others,
who have independently and honestly discovered the secret, from
using the trade secret.34 There is a "protectible property right"",
in trade secrets, however, which may be protected against those
who acquire and use the knowledge wrongfully. On the question
of novelty, all courts agree that an obvious article is not protectible
and cannot be the subject of a trade secret."' Whether a trade
secret must be valuable to be protectible has generated some dis-
cussion, but the better reasoning is that it need not be valuable.
3 7
The Restatement of Torts section 757 gives a comprehensive
statement of the nature of a trade secret:
Secrecy. The subject matter of a trade secret must be
secret. Matters of public knowledge or of general knowl-
edge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his
secret. Matters which are completely disclosed by the
goods which one markets cannot be his secret. Substan-
tially, a trade secret is known only in the particular busi-
ness in which it is used. It is not requisite that only the
proprietor of the business know it. He may, without losing
his protection, communicate it to employees involved in its
use. He may likewise communicate it to others pledged to
secrecy. Others may also know of it independently, as, for
example, when they have discovered the process or formula
by independent invention and are keeping it secret. Never-
theless, a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that
except by the use of improper means, these would be diffi-
cult in acquiring the information. An exact definition of
trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be considered
in determining whether given information is one's trade se-
cret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known
by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the
extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and
Cir. 1964). The court noted that the Sears doctrine does not apply to trade
secret situations. See Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., 41 F. Supp. 525
(W.D.N.Y. 1941); William A. Meier Co. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 95 F.
Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
33. Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181 (D. Md. 1962);
Juliano v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 453 (D. Mass. 1961).
34. Speedry Chem. Prod., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.
1962); Hoeltke v. C. M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 673 (1935).
35. Ferroline v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 923 (7th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954).
36. See, e.g., Official Airlines Schedule Inf. Serv., Inc. v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1964); Smoley v. N.J. Zinc Co., 106
F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1939); Juliano v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 453
(D. Mass. 1961).
37. See 2 CALLAMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION 299 (2d ed. 1950); A. TURNER
THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 107 (1962).
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to his competition; (5) the amount of effort or money ex-
pended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease
or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
3 8
There has been some speculation that Sears-Compco elimi-
nated trade secrets.3 9 This is unlikely for several reasons, salient
of which is that Sears-Compco was directed to patent and copyright
law and did not extend to trade secrets.
In all the abovementioned theories of recovery an essential
element is the trade secret. The substance of a trade secret must
be novel, and must be treated by the company as a trade secret.
Company X may treat information as a trade secret in several
different ways.4 0 When involved in intracompany communications,
blueprints should be stamped with a notice saying for example:
"Company Confidential," "Not for distribution outside of the Com-
pany," or "Secret and Proprietary Information." Such stamps put
employees on notice that they are dealing with trade secrets. If
information need only be distributed to certain individuals within
the company, it should not be made available to any curious em-
ployee, but should receive only limited distribution. Manufactur-
ing processes should be removed from public view and notices of
"Restricted Area" placed over doors leading to processes involving
trade secrets. Employees should be informed, upon hiring, of the
significance of trade secrets, their obligation as an. employee, and
should be required to sign an employee non-disclosure agreement.41
38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 5 (1939) (em-
phasis added).
39. See Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal
Patent and Antitrust Policy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432 (1967); Comment, 53 VA.
L. REV. 356 (1967). See also Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965), where the court discusses the policy
reasons for recognizing trade secrets.
40. See generally Correa, Protection of Trade Secrets, 18 Bus. LAW.
531 (1963).
41. This form is used by a large corporation:
WHEREAS, in its business, Employer has developed and uses
commercially valuable technical and nontechnical information and,
to guard the legitimate interests of Emnloyer, it is necessary for
Employer to protect certain of the information* either by patents
or confidence; and
WHEREAS, the aforesaid information is vital to the success of:
Employer's business, and Employee through his activities may be-
come acquainted therewith, and may contribute thereto. either
through inventions, discoveries, improvements or otherwise;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of and as part of the terms.
of employment of Employee by Employer, at a wage or salary and
for such length of time as the employment shall continue, it is
agreed as follows:
(1) Unless Employee shall first secure Employer's written con-
sent, Employee shall-not disclose or use at any time either during
or subsequent to said employment, any secret or confidential in-
formation of Employer of which Employee becomes informed
during said employment, whether or not developed by Employee,
except as required in Employee's duties to Employer.
(2) Upon termination of said employment, Employee shall
[Vol. 72
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Another essential element of the theories of recovery is a con-
fidential relationship. Although many courts have considered a
trade secret to be property, others have relied solely on the confi-
dential relationship. In E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland42 Mr. Justice Holmes said:
The word property as applied to . . . trade secrets is an un-
analyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of
the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary re-
quirements of good faith .... The property may be de-
nied but the confidence cannot be.
43
The relationship may be expressed or implied. Remedies for
breach of express agreements that the relationship is confidential
are rather straightforward and will not be treated except to say
that recovery will be granted upon breach.4 4 Implied agreements
of confidence between a company and its customer do not lend
themselves to terse analysis, and will be treated in the sections
to follow.
Loss Of A Trade Secret
Losing a trade secret is not a particularly difficult task. Gen-
erally, it is lost by public disclosure, which may result from several
actions by company X. If the trade secret is disclosed in an issued
patent, it is lost. 45 If the customer is given a patent application
under a confidential agreement, that agreement can only be bind-
ing until the patent issues.46 Any other public written publica-
tion will cause the trade secret to be lost.47 A sale to the customer
without restriction, even a single sale, will constitute a disclosure;
4 8
but, as in the patent situation, a restricted sale need not be a public
disclosure if the proper restrictions are maintained.
That the trade secret has become public knowledge, however,
does not necessarily extinguish company X's cause of action against
a customer. One line of cases in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
promptly deliver to Employer all drawings, blueprints, manuals,
letters, notes, notebooks, reports, and all other materials of a
secret or confidential nature relating to Employer's business and
which are in the possession or under the control of the Employee.
42. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
43. Id. at 102.
44. For a discussion of express agreements of confidence see A. TUR-
NER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETs 268 (1962).
45. Speedry Chem. Prod., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328 (2d
Cir. 1962); Haskel v. Lever Bros., 243 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
46. Tempo Instrument, Inc..v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y.
1964). However, a contract requiring the disclosee not to disclose even
after the patent issues is binding and enforceable. See Bolt Ass'n, Inc. v.
Alpine Geophysical Ass'n, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.J. 1965).
47. See Van Prod. Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa.
248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965). Furthermore, if the trade secret is disclosed upon
examination of the article being placed on the market, the secret is lost.
Houser v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 202 F. Supp. 181 (D. Md. 1962).
48. Juliano v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 453 (D. Mass. 1961).
Fall 1967)
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holds that what is actually being protected is the manner in which
the trade secret is obtained.49 If a customer obtains the trade
secret wrongfully from company X, he cannot defend on the
ground that the trade secret was elsewhere publicly disclosed and
free for anyone to use. Thus, a permanent injunction is granted.
The Second Circuit took a contrary position in Conmar Products
Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co.,55 saying that a confidential
relationship rests on the secret nature of the disclosure; if there
is no secret, there can be no confidence, and no injunctive relief.
This approach, known as the "Conmar rule," has three variations
which represent compromises between the two extreme positions.
First, the court will grant an injunction which will be dissolved
when the secret becomes public through unprotected disclosure.51
Second, an injunction is given for the remainder of the estimated
time it would have taken a competitor to reverse engineer the
product.52 Third, an injunction is given from the time of judgment
for the estimated period of time it would take to reverse engineer
and market the product. 3  The Restatement appears to be in line
with the strict Conmar doctrine. "Matters of public knowledge or
of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by
one as his secret. ' '5 4 As has been noted, however, only the novel
feature of the trade secret will be protected.
For the customer to say that the transaction between company
X and the customer was at arms length will not avoid liability.
An arms length dealing is not ipso facto a public disclosure if a
restricted agreement can be implied."5 However, as noted in
Fiske v. American Character, Inc.:'1
49. See Shellmar Prod. Co. v. Allen-Qually Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1936); A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (6th
Cir. 1934); A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 447-53 (1962).
50. 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949). See also A. TuRNER, THE LAW OF
TRADE SECRETS 440-47 (1962).
51. Space Aero. Prod. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1966).
52. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d
134 (9th Cir. 1965).
53. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965).
54. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 5 (1939). Note,
however, that an independent discovery by a third party does not amount
to a public disclosure. Several parties who have independently discovered
the trade secret may individually retain the trade secret. None may ex-
clude the other from using the secret, however. Imperial Chem. Indus.
Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1965).
55. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953):
Nor is it an adequate answer for defendant to say that the transac-
tions with plaintiffs were at arms length. That fact does not de-
tract from the conclusion that, but for those very transactions,
defendants would not have learned, from plaintiffs, of the container
design. The implied limitation on the use to be made of the in-
formation had its roots in the "arms length" transaction.
Id. at 376-77.
56. 259 F. Supp. 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
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A confidential transaction can, indeed, arise without use of
a special formula of words, but it does not arise out of mere
default of expressions negating it; it must always arise out
of facts, events, relations or verbal acts; it is a positive
legal relation and rests on positive matter or it does not
exist. Disclosure alone is not enough to make out a con-
fidential relation when the parties are prospective vendor
and vendee and dealing in terms of a device believed to be
patentable, and from the obviousness of its structure, in-
capable of being marketed without total disclosure of its
novel elements.
5 7
This statement recognizes that vendor and vendee do deal at
arms length and that there should be no assumption that their
transactions in the normal course of business are confidential. It
is broad enough to recognize "facts, events, relations or verbal acts"
as means by which a confidential relationship can be found. Thus
the Fiske court would probably find a confidential relationship if
the customer knew that the disclosure was only for future sale
purposes between the customer and company X. The customer's
act of requesting a disclosure may be enough, therefore, to create
a confidential relationship. When company X submits the proposal
to the customer, however, the disclosure alone will probably not
create a confidential relationship. That the company labels the re-
lationship confidential is not enough. There must be some un-
derstanding, express or implied, that the proposal is given on a re-
stricted basis, which may include a notice that the disclosure is
made for future sale purposes only.
Establishment Of A Confidential Relationship
In Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co.,58 the plain-
tiff distributed prints to its customers who in turn showed them
to defendant. The prints were given to acquaint the customers
with railroad cars they were purchasing. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court said:
While there was no expressed restriction placed on the
ownership of the prints, or any expressed limitation as to
the use to which they were to be put, it is clear . . . that
the purpose for which they were delivered by the plaintiff
was understood by all the parties.59
Further in Smith v. Dravo Corp., 0 where the plaintiff adver-
tised his product in a limited fashion and defendant thought he
would buy the product and the business, the court found a confi-
dential relationship implied from the relationship of the parties.
The plaintiff gave the defendant patent applications, blueprints,
57. Id. at 769.
58. 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4 (1904).
59. Id. at 478, 60 A. at 10.
60. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
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and samples, after which defendant manufactured a device em-
ploying the plaintiff's features. The court said:
[P]laintiffs disclosed their design for one purpose, to enable
defendant to appraise it with a view in mind of purchasing
the business. There can be no question that defendant
knew and understood this limited purpose. Trust was re-
posed in it by the plaintiffs that the information thus trans-
mitted would be accepted subject to that limitation.
Nor is it an adequate answer for defendant to say that
the transaction with plaintiffs were at arms length....
The fact does not detract from the conclusion that, but for
those very transactions, defendants would not have learned,
from plaintiffs, of the container design. The implied limi-
tation on the use to be made of the information had its
roots in the "arms-length" transaction. 61
In William A. Meik Co. v. Anchor Hocking Corp.,62 the court
said:
Where the inventor of an unpatented article not yet
on the market exhibits it to a manufacturer for the sole
purpose of selling or leasing it, there is an implied agree-
ment by the manufacturer not to use anything of novelty
disclosed by the device for its own benefit .
3
The leading case in the area of implied confidential agreements
is Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Manufacturing Co. 64  The plaintiff in-
ventor wrote the defendant telling him of a device he had invented.
The defendant wrote back saying he was interested in the device.
The plaintiff sent a patent application to the defendant, who re-
jected the proposal, but at a later date began to manufacture and
sell similar devices. This much quoted statement is the crux of
the opinion:
While there was no express agreement that defendant was
to hold the information so disclosed as a confidential matter
and to make no use of it unless it should purchase the in-
vention, we think that in equity and good conscience such
an agreement was implied; and having obtained the disclo-
sure under such circumstances, defendant ought not be
heard to say that there was no obligation to respect the con-
fidence thus reposed in it.05
As noted in Fiske v. American Character Inc.,66 a confidential
relationship must arise out of "facts, events, relations or verbal
acts. '6 7 The cases heretofore discussed illustrate which of these
61. Id. at 376-77.
62. 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
63. Id. at 268 (dictum) (emphasis added).
64. 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935).
65. Id. at 923. Note here that the inventor did not submit the pro-
posal until the customer requested it.
66. 259 F. Supp. 766 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
67. Id. at 769.
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factors will create a confidential relationship. Another fact which
may lead to a confidential relationship is the inclusion of tolerances
on blueprints. For many products, ' the allowable dimensions and
tolerances are the crux of the trade secret and including them may
indicate, as a matter of custom and usage in the trade, that a con-
fidential disclosure was intended.
The relationship of the parties is particularly significant, for
it establishes what the courts call the "purpose" of the disclosure.
A vendor-customer relationship indicates that the "purpose" of the
disclosure is for evaluation for possible future sale.6 8 It is not a
mere advertisement. The vendor expects compensation whether
it or the customer initiated negotiations for the proposal. As noted,
however, in the absence of collateral facts, events, or verbal acts,
a disclosure submitted by company X without prior negotiations
may be insufficient to establish a confidential relationship. In
that situation, the relationship may be established through an im-
plied agreement stemming from an express agreement. For exam-
ple, in Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co.6" the Servo
Corporation sold a device to Southern Railroad under the follow-
ing agreement:
Servo Corporation of America has a proprietary interest
in the information contained herein, and in some in-
. stances has patent rights in the systems and components
described and requests that you distribute it only. to those
responsible people within your organization who have an
official interest. Insofar as the material contained in this
document is novel Servo Corporation of America retains a
proprietary interest in its development and manufacture. 0
The court found a confidential relationship, although the
agreement itself was little more than a request to limit the distri-
bution of samples and a statement that Servo had a proprietary
interest in the information. Nowhere was it expressed that a con-
fidential relationship existed, but it was implied from the writing
and the relations of the parties. /
.68. Heyman v. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963):
Where, as here, the parties are a seller and a prospective purchaser,
certain disclosures will usually be made about the thing which is
for sale so -that the purchaser may rationally assess the merits of
concluding the bargain. If the information disclosed is of such a
nature as to otherwise qualify as a trade secret, we think the pro-
spective buyer is bound to receive the -information in confidence.
As the prospective buyer is given the information for the limited
purpose of aiding him in deciding whether to buy he is bound to
receive the information-for use within the ambit of this limitation.
He may not in good conscience accept the information; terminate
negotiations for the sale; and then, using vital data secured from
the would-be seller, set out on a venture of his own. Whatever
conduct courts should countenance when parties bargain at arms
length, we think parties should be expected to comply with these.
essentials of fair dealing.
Id. at 587.
69. 337 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1964).
70. Id. at 722.
Fall 1967]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Servo represents another significant point in that Servo Cor-
poration sold the device to Southern. Regardless of this fact, a
confidential relationship was found. The court emphasized that
this was a restricted sale with reservations, that the information
disclosed was a trade secret, and that the sale was for experimental
use.
In summary, then, the best way to establish a confidential re-
lationship is to have an agreement which expressly states that the
parties are entering into a confidential relationship. The next best
method apparently would be to place a notice on the blueprints
or samples from which a confidential relationship could be implied.
Such notices might include "For evaluation purposes only," "For
testing use only," "Not for general distribution," or "Company X
retains a proprietary interest in the information herein." Coupling
the notice with a showing that the relationship between the parties
existed for the purpose of sale will probably create a confidential
relationship which can be implied from the circumstances.
An interesting question is whether a common law copyright
notice such as 'unpublished work" is an express agreement from
which the implication of a confidential relationship arises. Such
a notice would seem to raise a strong implication, because the
theory of limited publication which allows the common law copy-
right holder to show the work without losing the protection is based
upon a confidential relationship with those being shown the work.
Company X would still have to establish that the customer has
either expressly or impliedly agreed to the limited publication,
however, by showing the purpose of the publication.
If a patent has been applied for, and "patent pending" is
stamped on the blueprints and samples, this may also create a
strong implication that a confidential relationship exists. -A patent
application and the invention embodied therein are surrounded by
an aura of secrecy. They are retained in confidence by the Patent
Office. Although it is true that articles are manufactured for pub-
lic consumption while a patent is still pending, a showing by a
company X that the samples were delivered only to a single custo-
mer may indicate an intention to retain secrecy. When the appli-
cation itself is delivered to the customer, an even greater presump-
tion of secrecy may arise since the application clearly was not in-
tended for public disclosure until the patent issued.
In the absence of any writing from which a confidential rela-
tionship can be implied, the relations of the parties and the pur-
pose for which they are related become controlling. If the custo-
mer requests the proposal, a case for confidential relationship can
be more readily established than if company X submits the proposal
to the customer without negotiation.
If the company sells the samples to the customer, the absence
of a writing may indicate an outright, unrestricted sale, thereby
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destroying the trade secret. A sale under a restricted agreement,
however, whether the agreement is a notice from which a confi-
dential relationship can be implied or a full expressed agreement of
a confidential relationship, will not destroy the trade secret or the
confidential relationship.
71
Finally, there is an insidious practice developing in the setting
of confidential relationships between small suppliers and compa-
nies which maintain a dominant market position. Large corpora-
tions are using their economic power to eliminate any confidential
relationship which might arise in favor of their suppliers. The
following letter is paraphrased from a letter which was actually
set by a corporation (customer) to a supplier (company X). It is
to be copied by the supplier under its own letterhead, signed, and




Because we (company X) are being allowed the oppor-
tunity to work with your engineers and to become familiar
with your needs regarding (project or proposal), all of
which is to our advantage, we agree and grant to you a free
license which is both irrevocable and non-exclusive to
make, use, sell or have made in this and all countries arti-
cles of manufacture, compositions of matter, machines and
processes containing any patentable concepts conceived or
obtained by us (company X) stemming from work on the
above named proposal or stemming from improvements
upon concepts or inventions you have disclosed to us in
relation to the above named proposal. We recognize that
the word "you" means present and future subsidiaries, and
companies controlled by or associated with your central
operation.
We further agree that we give you no license to patents
or patent applications filed in the United States Patent Of-
fice or issued by that office before the date of this agree-
ment. We agree that no license is granted for patentable
concepts conceived or obtained six (6) months after the
termination of the work relating to the above named pro-
ject or proposal.
We agree to inform you immediately of any patentable
concepts that we decide to file on which relate to the li-








In this writer's opinion such an agreement is deplorable. In
essence the customer is saying to company X:
Dear Company X:
We are too large to be bothered with the Patent and.
Copyright Acts and the law of trade secrets, so if you want
to do business with us, forget any proprietary rights that
you think you may have. Ifyou don't like this arrange-
ment, we will go elsewhere and pressure some other firm
into agreement.
Does company X give up the potentialbusiness with the customer,
or does it yield to bigness? When the customer is in an oligopolistic
industry, is there much choice? Such:an, agreement is apparently.
not violative of the anti-trust laws, for in a backhanded fashion
it promotes competition. But is it any less unconscionable than
that infamous disclaimer struck down in Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors?
72
Under this type of agreement, the customer may send company
X's proposals to company X's competitors and solicit bids for pro-
duction. The bids are received and company X's competitors,
which did not have engineering costs to consider, have lower bids.
Company X is out of business. Alternatively company X's custo-
mer may reverse engineer the samples and manufacture them as
their own. The result is coercion under color of law. Some form of
"inverse anti-trust law" is needed which could effectively combat




Plaintiff company will almost invariably be confronted. with
the defenses that: (1) the alleged trade secret was publicly dis-
closed by the company and therefore was in the public domain and
freely copyable; and (2) the article was developed independently
by the defendant.74 Both defenses are questions of fact.
In Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Manufacturing Co., 5 a defense of
independent development was raised and the only proof was oral.
The court said:
72. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
73. This is not a criticism of companies which protect themselves from
liability by disclaiming a confidential relationship ,with extra-company
persons who submit ideas without prior negotiation, because in those -situa-
tions the ideas are foisted upon the company without warning by the aspir-
ing inventor. For a discussion of submission of idea cases see. Sceales,
Company Liability for Use of an Idea, 69.DIcK. L. REv. 245 (1965).
74. See, e.g., Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730 (8th
Cir. 1965); Heyman v. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963); Speedry
Chem. Prod., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1962); Hoeltke v.
C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935); Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964)..
75. 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935).
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It is. well settled that where an unpatented device, the ex-
istence and use of which are proven only by oral testimony,
is set up as a complete anticipation of a patent, the proof
sustaining it must be clear, satisfactory and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.... And we think the same rule should be
applied against one who admittedly receives a disclosure
from an inventor, proceeds thereafter to manufacture arti-
cles of similar character, and, when called on to account,
makes answer that he was using his own ideas and not the
ideas imparted to him.
7 6
Thus proof of this defense is difficult. In misappropriation cases
a mere similarity between the disclosed item and the allegedly mis-
appropriated item is generally all that is necessary.
77
Misappropriation Of Trade Secrets
In Smith v. Dravo Corp.78 the elements of misappropriation
were set out by a federal court applying Pennsylvania law:
(1) existence of trade secrets,
(2) communicated to the defendant,
(3) while he is in a position of trust and confidence, and
(4) use by the defendant to the injury of the plaintiff.7
9
In Schreger v. Casco Products Corp.0 misappropriation was
defined to be:
(1) that there was a disclosure in confidence,
(2) that the disclosure was of something novel,
(3) that defendants appropriated the information dis-
closed to their own use.8'
The court said:
Trade secrets revealed to a prospective purchaser during
the course of negotiations cannot be appropriated by the
prospective purchaser if the negotiations fail. The law rec-
ognizes trade secrets as a species of property right and pro-
tects them by enforcing "certain rudimentary requirements
of good faith.
'8 2
The question whether misappropriation of trade secrets sounds
in tort, contract or breach of confidence is not easily answered.
The Restatement of Torts sections 75783 and 7594 contemplate a
76. Id. at 923.
77. See Smith v. Dravo Corp,, 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Hoeltke v.
C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935).
78. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
79. Id. at 373.
80. 97 F. Supp. 159 (D. Conn.), modified, 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951).81. Id. at 167.
82. Id.
83. RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b at 5 (1939):
Nevertheless, a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that,
except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in
acquiring the information.
84. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 759 (1939):
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tort in the procurement of the secret. A case in which the trade
secret is voluntarily disclosed and then used by the disclosee in
violation of the confidence is not strictly "misappropriation." In
that situation breach of confidence or breach of contract is neces-
sarily used. A confidential relationship is not necessary to an
action for misappropriation, however, for in the strictest sense mis-
appropriation is a tort of taking by fraud. 5 Therefore misappro-
priation, like other torts, requires intent or knowledge on the part
of the alleged wrongdoer. "Good faith" misappropriation is not
possible.
These strict lines of interpretation have been violated repeat-
edly. In Smith v. Dravo Corp.,8 for example, where plaintiff gave
defendant blueprints and samples and defendant manufactured a
device employing plaintiff's features, there was no "tort" misap-
propriation. Apparently the court was referring to either a breach
of contract implied in fact or a breach of confidence, for the dis-
closure to defendant was voluntary and not obtained by fraud or
stealth. A better definition of what occurs in most of these cases
is trade-secret "misuse" which results in a breach of confidence or
a breach of contract implied in fact. Whether the misappropriation
sounds in tort or contract is important in light of the statute of
limitations, 7 but not significant for pleading purposes under the
liberalized federal rules."8 The statute of limitations is even less
important since Underwater Storage Co. v. United States Rubber
Co.,s 9 which held that misappropriation was a continuing tort.
Breach Of Contract Implied In Fact
This remedy has received attention in the section on establish-
ment of a confidential relationship, for generally the implied con-
tract to which the courts refer is "an implied agreement on the
part of the defendant not to use anything of novelty disclosed" 90
by the plaintiff for the defendant's benefit. In other words, there
is an implied agreement to form a confidential relationship. When
the defendant breaches this implied-in-fact contract, he must of ne-
cessity breach the confidence reposed in him. The implied agree-
One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business interest,
procures by improper means information about another's business
is liable to the other for the harm caused by his possession, dis-
closure or use of the information.
85. See id., Comment b at 5.
86. 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953).
87. The statute of limitations is normally two years for a tort action
and six years for a contract action measured from the date the cause of
action arose. See, e.g., PA. STAT. AwN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953).
88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 & 8 (a).
89. 371 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 859 (1967).
See also Note, 1967 DUKE L.J. 450 (1967).
90. Gilbert v. General Motors Corp., 41 F. Supp. 525, 527 (W.D.N.Y.
1941), ajf'd, 133 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 743 (1943).
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ment may either evolve from an express agreement or be implied
from the manifast intentions of the parties in the absence of an
express agreement.9 1
Breach Of Confidence
Breach of confidence is a purely equitable action which recog-
nizes that the parties should be held to a standard of conduct some-
what higher than the morals of the marketplace.9 2 In establishing
a confidential relationship, the parties actually form a quasi-
fiduciary relationship. Thus, the divulgence of confidential infor-
mation violates a "trust" relationship, and is neither a question of
contract, though its existence must be shown from the circum-
stances, nor a tort question.
Unjust Enrichment
Unjust enrichment is equated with quasi-contract or contract
implied in law, 3 and can be an independent basis for relief. To
prove unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant has obtained value without the classic quid pro quo-
consideration. The plaintiff must also show that he was not a vol-
unteer or an officious intermeddler.
Unjust enrichment, however, is inextricably woven into the
other remedies mentioned, for in all the defendant is accused of
getting something for nothing. Thus, it is not surprising to find
the following language:
If a person communicates a novel idea to another with the
intention that the latter may use the idea and compensate
him for such use, the other party is liable for such use and
must pay compensation if actually he appropriates the
idea and employs it in connection with his own activities.
It is immaterial whether the communication is expressly
made in confidence, so long as it is made on an understand-
ing either tacit or express that the person communicating
the idea, or the owner of the idea, expected to be compen-
sated if it was to be used by the person receiving it. This
doctrine is not limited to patentable inventions, and has
been extended to ideas of various kinds that were not sub-
ject either to patents or copyrights.
91. See Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716
(2d Cir. 1964); Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
William A. Meier Co. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa.
1951). In these cases it is not clear if the implication was one of confidence
exclusive of contract law or if the implication of confidence created an
implied-in-fact contract coexisting with the express contract.
92. See Becker v. Coutoure Laboratories Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1923);
A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 307-10 (1962).




It may well be that the defendant honestly and in good
faith thought that he was entitled to do what he did. He is
not charged with fraud, actual or constructive, the issue is
not one of good or bad faith. Good faith is immaterial.
The question is whether the defendant has been unjustly
enriched by using the plaintiff's idea, and should pay com-
pensation therefor ex aequo et bono.9 4
Here the court found unjust enrichment based upon an implied-
in-fact contract.
The quotation above raises the collateral problem of when un-
just enrichment may be used to seek relief. The language indicates
that good or bad faith is immaterial. The court in William A,
Meier Co. v. Anchor Hocking Corp.,95 however, took a diametri-
cally opposed position by saying:
The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not comprehend
that one may induce another unknowingly to exploit an in-
ventive concept without giving him an opportunity to nego-
tiate a contract for its use, or exercise volition as to whether
or not to accept its benefits, and then, after knowledge of
the claimed invention had been kept from him by silence or
artifice, hold him liable for substantial damages because of
appropriation. An essential element of the doctrine as ap-
plied in patent cases is that an appropriation of another's
ideas has been knowingly or wrongfully made.96
The various theories of recovery, whether equitable or legal,
in contract or in tort, are subordinate to the general proposition
that a compensible wrong can be righted. This is especially true
under the federal rulesY7 What is of prime importance is the actual
remedy afforded the party who has been illegally deprived of his
trade secret. The recoverable damages or injunctive relief include
an accounting for profits,98 an order to return secret information,9 9
an order to destroy secret information or products which have
been built from secret information, 0 0 an injunction against wrong-
ful use or disclosure,10 1 or damages where adequate.1 02 A few
states have also imposed criminal sanctions on those who pirate
94. Trenton Indus. v. A.E. Peterson Mfg. Co., 165 F. Supp. 523, 532
(S.D. Cal. 1958) (emphasis added).
95. 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
96. Id. at 269.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 & 8 (a).
98. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Assmann, 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N.Y.
S. 334 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
99. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60
A. 4 (1904).
100. American Bell Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 F. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1888).
101.. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531 (1934);
Space Aero Prod. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1966).
102. Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup.
Ct. 1946). See generally Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets,





The law of trade secrets can undoubtedly protect company X
under the proper circumstances. Trade secret law is far from
flawless, however. Assuming that a customer will not accept an
express written agreement creating a confidential relationship,
the law protecting company X is based entirely upon implication.
Whatever the result may be in specific fact situations, the net effect
is that establishing a confidential relationship by implication, in
the absence of fraud or bad faith on the part of the customer, is
tenuous ground upon which a corporation might base its entire
preproduction sales effort. This is especially true when a customer
summarily rejects any attempt to come to an express agreement.
A later attempt to establish a confidential relationship by implica-
tion has little efficacy.
04
Company X wants to protect itself from the beginning and
wants to have an efficient system of preproduction disclosures for
internal use. Under contract theory a solution can be obtained.
A form letter should be drafted in the following fashion:
In acknowledgement of your interest in company X's
---- - -------------.----.-.-.---........- -- -- - - ---. , company X offers
unpublished blueprints and/or samples of the requested in-
formation for evaluation and testing within customer's
company in contemplation of company X's future produc-
tion for, and sale to customer of production materials at
the price of -------------
If customer wishes to evaluate these proposals, please
so inform company X and the samples and/or blueprints
shall be sent immediately.
Customer accepts company X's offer for blueprints
and/or samples regarding the above mentioned items.
Signature of Customer
All division heads should be given this letter (which has a
detachable carbon copy) with the understanding that they are
never to volunteer samples without receiving a request from a cus-
tomer or a demonstration of interest on the part of the customer.
Thus, instead of volunteering blueprints for evaluation, the sales
department should determine if a customer is interested in the
area which the blueprints cover. If the customer demonstrates
103. See Comment, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L.R. 324 (1966) for a discussion
of criminal statutes in the area of trade secrets. See also Note, 50 MANN.
L. REV. 1049 (1966).
104. See Van Rensselear v. General Motors Corp., 223 F. Supp. 323
(E.D. Mich. 1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1963). Here the court clearly
demonstrates that there is no basis for liability, even by implication, if the
customer declares that it is not going to deal in confidence.
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such an interest, the above-mentioned letter should be sent. Not
until the signed letter has been received from the customer should
the blueprints or samples be delivered. Alternatively, the salesman
may have the offer signed by the customer in the field as provided
on the form.
No proposal should be sent without first sending the letter.
The carbon copy of the returned letter should be given to the
Patent Department for filing in the central proposal file. Thus,
proposals filed by division and date may be centrally controlled and
information about them will be readily accessible.
The letter has several advantages. It recognizes that the cus-
tomer requested or demonstrated interest in the proposal. By
making the letter an offer, acceptance by the customer creates a
contract for the sale of goods, though a restricted sale. If the
proposal is not sold, the letter can be worded in terms of a loan
or a license to use. Although not a contract, the terms of the loan
or license would be binding on the customer.10 5
The customer agrees that it will use the samples and blueprints
to evaluate and test the company X proposal. Any further use
would be breach of contract. The testing term insures that the
sale will not be a public sale. The advantage of making evaluation
and testing a contractual obligation is clear. Under trade secret
theory, these words were used to create an implication of a confi-
dential relationship. Now they become an express obligation.
Stating that the proposal is given in contemplation of future
production for, and sale to, the customer defines damages for breach
of the contract. If the customer solicits competitive bids he
breaches the contract to evaluate and test, but what are the dam-
ages? Merely recovering the cost of the samples is an inadequate
remedy. The wording of the letter, however, indicates what the
contract contemplates-profits and future business. Loss of the
contemplated gain resulting from breach is the damage.
One final problem must be overcome. Since these samples are
not patented, a sale or disclosure without restriction places them
in the public domain, and Sears-Compco allows free copying. Al-
though the letter states that the preproduction samples and un-
published blueprints are for testing purposes, which alone indicates
that they are not in the public domain, to guarantee this result the
blueprints should be stamped "unpublished work" to indicate that
their disclosure to the customer was not a publication.
105. One corporation uses the following loan agreement:
This drawing is loaned without other consideration than the agree-
ment and condition that it is not to be reproduced, copied or
otherwise disposed of directly or indirectly, and is not to be used
in whole or in part to assist in making or to furnish any information
for the making of drawings, prints, apparatus or parts thereof.
The acceptance of this drawing will be construed as an acceptance
of the foregoing conditions, and as an admission of the exclusive
ownership of the corporation of and to the drawing.
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Whether a "For Evaluation and Experimental Testing" notice
should be stamped on the blueprints and attached to the sample
is debatable. Since the customer is already contractually bound,
the notice may merely be redundant and may not be accepted by
the engineering department of the customer. On the other hand, it
puts any third party who may receive the blueprint or sample
from the customer on notice that use is restricted, thereby deter-
ring acceptance of the proposal from the customer. Third parties
may, of course, be enjoined from interfering with the contractual
relationship with company X and its customer; even if they were
unaware that the customer was breaching a contract by asking for
competitive bids,'0 6 they could be enjoined from making the item
covered by the bid. The term of the injunction is uncertain, and
may only extend until the customer accepts company X's proposal
and company X goes into production.
Under this contractual arrangement the trade secret ground
for relief remains. It may still be argued that an implied confi-
dential arrangement has arisen and that disclosure or use of the
proposals is a breach of that confidence and unjust enrichment.
Furthermore, if company X treats the samples and blueprints as
trade secrets, it supports the contention that no public disclosure
is intended.
The Transmittal Letter Contract
The transmittal letter would seem to be the best means to es-
tablish a contractual obligation. Whenever blueprints or samples
are sent to the customer, the following letter should be enclosed:
In acknowledgment of your interest in ----------------------------
------ --- , company X offers a proposal for blue-
prints and samples and unpublished blueprints, which are
to be used to exaluate and test experimentally the com-
pany X proposal within customer's organization, are sold
(or sold at a price of $ - /blueprint or sample)
in contemplation of future production for, agreement with,
106. As a practical matter, company X may not wish to bring suit
against its customer, but may have no qualms about suing competitors
who have received information from the customer. Both under contract
theory and under the other theories developed on the basis of a confidence,
third parties may be sued for the available civil remedies. This is not
only true when the third party knows it is obtaining information in breach
of confidence or contract, Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co.,
337 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1964), but also where the third party was ignorant of
the contract or confidence. When the third party is ignorant of the con-
fidence, however, it will only be liable for damages if it continues to use
the information after notice of the confidence or contract. This is further
qualified by allowing liability or injunctive relief only when the third
party has not detrimentally changed its position in reliance on the in-
formation. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa.
464, 60 A. 4 (1901); A. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 413-18 (1962);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 758 (b), Comment e at 21-22 (1939).
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and sale to customer.
Acceptance of the enclosed samples and/or blueprinta
shall be acceptance of the terms stated herein. Acceptance
of the samples and/or blueprints shall occur after customer
has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them. Such
reasonable opportunity shall not exceed five days after re-
ceipt.
Company X
The customer is bound to the same extent as in the preceding
section. The second paragraph of the letter complies with the re-
quirements of sections 2-2061°7 and 2-60610s of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Transmittal letters are part of the custom and usage
in the industry and their terms have been recognized as binding on
the parties. 10 9 Again, copies of the transmittal letter should be
kept in a central proposal file, and no proposals should be sent
without the letter.
Should the customer pirate the proposal within the five day
acceptance period, the trade secret remedies are available. One
practical aspect of a transmittal letter is that the customer is more
likely to accept it than if he were required to enter into negotia-
tions.
One final note under contract theory is that the samples and
blueprints must still be treated as trade secrets by company X.
The contract is wholly based upon the assumption that the infor-
mation is proprietary. If it were not proprietary, or novel, the
restrictive terms might be an unreasonable restraint on alienation
of items in the public domain and void as unconscionable under
section 2-30211° of the Uniform Commercial Code. The caveat pre-
supposes that the samples or blueprints are alleged to have been
sold, because only then would the contract come under the Uni-
form Commercial Code. If the samples or blueprints are alleged
107. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206:
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances
(a) An offer to make a contract shall be construed as invit-
ing acceptance in any manner and by any medium rea-
sonable in the circumstances.
108. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of
Section 2-602), but such acceptance does not occur until
the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them.
109. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943). This case stands for the proposition that acceptance of
goods is acceptance of the terms attached to them. Although it arises in
credit card situations where conditions are stamped on the card, the analogy
holds. See generally Comment, 30 AL3ANY L. REv. 79 (1966).
110. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. Contracts of this nature
have been enforced, however. See Bolt Ass'n, Inc. v. Alpine Geophysical
Ass'n, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.J. 1965).
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to have been loaned or licensed, the agreement might be con-
sidered a restricted royalty-free license defined by the terms of the
letter. Any use beyond the enumerated terms would be a breach
of the agreement to evaluate and test trade secrets.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The problems created by disclosing preproduction samples and
blueprints to customers cannot be adequately solved in every sit-
uation by patent or copyright law. Company X must rely upon a
combination of patent, copyright, trade secret and contract law.
The optimum solution is to have an express agreement with
the customer stating that the samples and blueprints are given or
sold under a confidential relationship. This is a textbook proce-
dure, however, and not practical since such an agreement will not
be accepted by most customers.
A second and equally attractive solution is to enclose a trans-
mittal letter1 11 with all proposals sent. The customer would be
contractually bound by the terms of the agreement eliminating
the need to establish a confidential relationship by implication.
Another solution is to contract for the samples and blueprints
with certain restrictions which limit the use to which the customer
may put the samples and which create a confidential relationship
by implication. Several steps must be taken to effectuate this plan:
(1) Interest must be shown by the customer. Sam-
ples and blueprints should never be volunteered.
(2) Once the customer has demonstrated an interest in a
certain area, the following letter should be sent:
In acknowledgement of your interest in company X's
------------------------------ , company X offers unpublished blueprints
and/or samples of the requested information for evaluation
and testing within customer's company in contemplation of
company X's future production for, and sale to customer of
production materials at the price of $ ........
If customer wishes to evaluate these proposals, please
so inform company X and the samples and/or blueprints
shall be sent immediately.
Customer accepts company X's offer for blueprints
and/or samples regarding the above mentioned items.
Signature of Customer .
Alternatively, the salesman may have. the offer signed by:
the customer in the field as provided on the form....
(3) .When the customer sends back an acceptance, and
only then, the samples and blueprints may be sent.
(4) A carbon copy of the letter to the customer. and the.
acceptance should be sent to the patent department
central file.
111. See example p. 183:supra.
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(5) The blueprints should be stamped "Unpublished
Work," and the samples and blueprints may have "For
Evaluation and Testing" attached to them.
In both of the above contractual solutions, the samples and/or
blueprints should be treated as trade secrets. This should be done
as follows:
(a) All intracompany blueprints should be stamped "Com-
pany Confidential."
(b) Only those personnel directly involved with the par-
ticular sample or blueprint should be given access to it.
(c) All areas where trade secrets are being practiced or
prepared should be marked "Restricted Area-Author-
ized Personnel Only." These areas should be removed
from public view.
(d) Employees should be made aware of the significance
of trade secrets and should be required to sign a trade
secret non-disclosure agreement.
(e) All intracompany communications regarding the
trade secret should have limited distribution within
the company and have "Company Confidential" or
"Not to be Disclosed Outside of Company" stamped
on the communication.
In both contractual solutions, if the customer should disclose
the information to company X's competition for competitive bids,
or reverse engineer the proposals, breach of contract will lie. In-
junctive relief will be available against the customer or against those
parties to whom the information was disclosed. Furthermore, in
both, a central file is created which coordinates company X's effort
in this area.
Both letters may also be framed in terms of a loan or license
agreement if company X does not choose to sell the proposals. The
terms of the loan or license would be binding to the same extent
as the terms in a contractual setting.
A final solution is to attempt to establish a confidential rela-
tionship by implication from the conduct of the parties, from their
relationship, and from any statement such as "For evaluation pur-
poses only" which may be stamped on the blueprints or samples.
If, however, the customer will not accept anything that looks like
a restriction, then company X must decide as a matter of policy
whether it will deal with the customer, for there is no protection
for unrestricted proposals.
Finally, if a contractual or confidential relationship can be
shown to exist with the customer, company X may bring suit
against competitors to whom the customer has given the proprietary
information. This may be the best remedy since it avoids a direct
conflict with the customer.
112
GARY R. MYERS
112. A survey of 200 major companies was made by the author in an
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effort to ascertain how these companies protected pre-production disclos-
ures. One patent counsel noted that "there may be a morally or legally
enforceable right [against our customers], but it's just not done." In
other words, who is going to sue a good customer even if he does pirate
some proposals. Suit may still be advisable, however, against not-so-good
customers or third parties who receive proprietary information from good
customers.
Of the 200 companies, 98 replied. Of these 98, 79% sent out preproduc-
tion disclosures. However, only 42% of the preproduction disclosures con-
sisted of both samples and blueprints. Almost all of the 79% sent out
blueprints.
Only 21% of the companies charge for preproduction disclosures; 79%
simply give the samples. Those companies which sell disclosures almost
without exception attempt to recoup some part of the engineering costs in
the sale price. The companies are evenly split, however, on whether this
sale amounts to a public or an experimental disclosure. Many of the
companies which give their preproduction disclosures noted that they do
so to avoid any problems with a public disclosure by sale.
Of the companies which send out disclosures, 52% use some form of
restrictive notice on their blueprints. Indeed 41% believe that the request
by a customer for a proposal raises an implication of a confidential rela-
tionship. Only 15%, however, believe that by having their company
initiate negotiations for a proposal their company's position to claim a
confidential relationship is weakened. Furthermore, 27% believe that a
sale hinders the establishment of a confidential relationship. The clear
majority was of the opinion that initiating negotiations or selling the pro-
posals had no affect upon establishing a confidential relationship by im-
plication.
The question was asked: "Assuming the customer pays for the cost of
the sample, including engineering costs, do you consider any resulting
patent rights to be owned by you?" One Senior Patent Counsel answered:
Yes of course! A purchaser should get what he pays for and no
more. If a purchaser pays for a special machine engineered for
him, he gets such a machine and no more. The customer may
have paid for such an engineered product, but he did not pay for
the patent rights, which result as much from the sellers long term
investment in developing a skilled staff of engineers with much
background knowledge which may have taken many years to ac-
cumulate.
Agreement was unanimous on this point "in the absence of a contract to
the contrary."
